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NARROWER IS BETTER-THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S LATEST WORD
ON CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM AND THE PROBLEM
OF PLUS FACTORS: IN RE FLAT GLASS
I. INTRODUCTION
Surviving summary judgment in an antitrust suit alleging a conspiracy
is considerably more difficult than in a typical case.' The United States
Supreme Court has narrowed the range of permissible inferences to be
drawn from circumstantial evidence.2 When relying on circumstantial evi-
dence, a plaintiff must provide evidence that "tends to exclude" the possi-
bility of independent action.3 Although, the standard for granting
summary judgment is technically the same-granted only when there is no
genuine issue of material fact-the courts will apply a stricter interpreta-
tion of the evidence in order to prevent the discouragement of legitimate
and competitive business practices.
4
In oligopolist markets, where a few firms dominate a particular mar-
ket, a phenomenon exists in which markets may behave in a non-competi-
tive manner resembling price fixing without any actual agreement or
1. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986) (holding that "antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences
from ambiguous evidence" in determining whether to grant summary judgment);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984) (applying
higher standard in case of vertical conspiracy to maintain prices); In re Flat Glass
Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that higher threshold of
evidence required to survive summary judgment in antitrust cases avoids deterring
innocent conduct).
2. See Matsushita, 475 U.S at 587-88 (limiting inferences in case of alleged
predatory pricing schemes among competitors); Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 768 (limit-
ing inferences in case of alleged vertical conspiracy between manufacturer and its
distributors). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's higher inferential standard
in antitrust conspiracy cases, see infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (holding that for a plaintiff to withstand
motion for summaryjudgment "a plaintiff.., must present evidence 'that tends to
exclude the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted independently" (quot-
ing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764)). The Court in Matsushita held that mistaken infer-
ences in antitrust cases were particularly costly because of the hindrance they
would place on fair business conduct, which the antitrust laws were intended to
encourage. See id. at 594 (justifying heightened standard where alleged conspirato-
rial acts could reflect competitive behavior).
4. See FED. R. Clv. P. 56(c) (giving rule for granting summary judgment as
appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact"); see also Big
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that general standard for summary judgment is same in antitrust cases);
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR AI'PLICATION 1405b (2d ed. 2003) (claiming that
Matsushita did not change basic summary judgment principle, but simply altered
inference of what reasonable jury could conclude).
(1309)
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conspiracy on the part of the competitors.5 This is known as "conscious
parallelism."6 A seller may raise their prices in a supracompetitive market
in anticipation that competitors will likely follow by also raising their
prices, recognizing the extra profit to be made. 7 Such "tacit agreement"
has been termed "interdependent behavior" and is not itself unlawful.8
Consistent with the higher burden in antitrust cases, a plaintiff cannot
rely solely on parallel decision making by competitors to establish the exis-
tence of a conspiracy.9 A court cannot allow even extreme examples of
parallel pricing standing alone to withstand summary judgment.10 There
must be additional evidence that tends to show the parallel action among
5. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 657-63 (1962) (describ-
ing practical examples of conscious parallelism).
6. See id. (same). Conscious parallelism is often referred to as a sharing of
monopoly power or as "tacit agreement." See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, I
ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 9 (5th ed. 2002) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)) (describing con-
scious parallelism as sharing of monopoly power) [hereinafter ABA SEcTION]; Tur-
ner, supra note 5, at 663 (asserting that "it is not at all preposterous ... to classify
what transpires as a 'tacit agreement,' and to conclude ... that the agreement is
unlawful"). For a further discussion of conscious parallelism, see infra notes 43-51
and accompanying text.
7. See Turner, supra note 5, at 661-62 (illustrating case example). Turner con-
trasts an oligopolist market with a market dominated by many competitors. See id.
at 660 (asserting that in non-oligopolist market pressure on firms to lower prices is
irresistible). Whereas, in a non-oligopolist market a price reduction by one firm is
not likely to affect other competitor's market share, and thus they are not likely to
respond; in an oligopolist market a firm can expect that if they reduce their prices
other firms will respond similarly, thereby defeating the purpose of cutting prices.
See id. at 660-61 (finding that firms in oligopolist market may raise prices recogniz-
ing their shared interests).
8. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 227 (describing conscious parallelism as "not
in itself unlawful"); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1433a (stating that
courts are "nearly unanimous" in finding that conscious parallelism alone is not
unlawful conspiracy); Turner, supra note 5, at 663 (arguing that it is not "prepos-
terous . . . to classify what transpires as 'tacit agreement'"); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2000) (establishing that "conspiracy, in restraint of trade ... is declared to be
illegal").
9. See Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300-01 (11th
Cir. 2003) (applying heightened summary judgment standard to cases based on
conscious parallelism); InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3d
Cir. 2003) (stating "plus factors" are required in allegations based conscious paral-
lelism in order to "allay the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court"); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatachewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (same); Merck-Medco Managed Care v. Rite-Aid Corp., No. 98-
2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *15 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (unpublished per curiam
opinion) (same); Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998
F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[C]onscious parallelism cases 'are merely illustra-
tions of the more general proposition that there are legal limitations upon the
inferences which may be drawn from circumstantial evidence.'"). For a further
discussion on how the heightened inferential standard applies to cases of con-
scious parallelism, see infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 355 (2004) (stating
facts of cases, where five competitors raised their "list prices" for flat glass by same
1310 [Vol. 50: p. 1309
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competitors was the result of agreement and not merely conscious paral-
lelism.' These "plus factors" generally include three categories: 1) evi-
dence that the defendants acted contrary to self-interest; 2) evidence that
the defendants had a motive to enter into a conspiracy; and 3) evidence
pointing towards a traditional conspiracy. 12
The circuit courts have all approached the problem of plus factors in
roughly the same manner; however, the weight given to individual plus
factors has varied significantly.13 This Casebrief analyzes the different ap-
proaches adopted by the circuit courts to address conscious parallelism
and the problem of plus factors. Part II looks at the higher standard of
proof required by plaintiffs in antitrust conspiracy cases. 14 Specifically, it
looks closely at the phenomenon of conscious parallelism and examines
the two divergent approaches adopted by the circuit courts with regard to
what summary judgment standard is applicable in conspiracy claims based
on conscious parallelism. 15 Part III examines the Third Circuit's ap-
proach to the problem and its most recent case, In re Flat Glass Antitrust
amount in twelve days). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in In re Flat
Glass, see infra notes 90-112 and accompanying text.
11. See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 ("plaintiffs basing a claim of collusion
on inferences from consciously parallel behavior [must] show that certain 'plus
factors' also exist"); Williamson Oi4 346 F.3d at 1301 (stating test that requires
"price fixing plaintiffs" to demonstrate "plus factors"); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275
F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating unlawful agreement can be inferred when
accompanied by other factors); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (same); Merck-
Medco, 1999 WL 691840, at *9 (same).
12. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 1434 (discussing common "plus
factors"); see also In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (listing plus factors). A finding
that the defendant took action against their self-interest is crucial, as any action
consistent with good business judgment "disproves the existence of any conspiracy
motivation." See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1413a (asserting that inde-
pendent business justification for decision can be interdependent, which does not
prove conspiracy but does provide motive to conspire). Courts have recognized
that the "easiest" way to prove conspiracy is through evidence of traditional con-
spiracy. See, e.g., Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1244 (noting that "plus factors" are
required because "otherwise the evidence is equally consistent with legal behav-
ior") (citation omitted).
13. Compare Williamson Oi4 346 F.3d at 1301 ("[D]efendants may rebut the
inference of collusion by presenting evidence establishing that no reasonable
factfinder could conclude that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy."), with
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that court must avoid trap of weighing conflicting evidence and supposing
that "if no single item of evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally
to conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summaryjudgment"). See also
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws, 89
MINN. L. REv. 9, 30-31 (2004) (discussing Seventh Circuit's break from majority of
circuits in interpretation of Supreme Court standard).
14. For a discussion of the plaintiffs higher inferential burden in antitrust
cases, see infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of conscious parallelism and the circuit courts' interpre-
tation of the antitrust summary judgment standard in the context of conscious
parallelism, see infra notes 43-76 and accompanying text.
2005] CASEBRIEF 1311
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Litigation.1 6 Lastly, Part IV concludes that the Third Circuit and other cir-
cuits' narrow approach to the Supreme Court's standard of permissible
inferences in antitrust cases is the better approach.
17
II. CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM AND THE PROBLEM OF PLUS FACTORS
Section One of the Sherman Act states that: "[e]very contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce ... is declared to be illegal." 18 In order to establish an
illegal restraint of trade it must be shown that there is some type of agree-
ment among competitors. 19 Price fixing among competitors, for example,
has been declared a per se violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.20
But it is difficult for a plaintiff to ever directly prove the existence of an
express agreement of horizontal price fixing. 21 Thus, circumstantial evi-
16. 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's ap-
proach to conscious parallelism, see infra notes 77-119 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of how the narrower approach is the better approach, see
infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Supreme Court has held that only "unreasona-
ble" restraints of trade are unlawful. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 58 (1911) (asserting that because beneficial business contracts could be seen as
restraint of trade, Section One only forbids those which are "unreasonably restric-
tive of competitive conditions"); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 23,
THE RULE OF REASON 1 (1999) (citing Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 1) (discussing Sec-
tion One of Sherman Act) [hereinafter RULE OF REASON].
19. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (cit-
ing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)) (requiring "agree-
ment" to establish illegality); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996,
999 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[S]ection 1 liability is predicated upon some form of con-
certed action."); Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1364
(3d Cir. 1992) (stating that to sustain claim under Section One plaintiff must es-
tablish concerted action); EdwardJ. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d
105, 110 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that unilateral action cannot violate Section
One); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1400a ("Most antitrust suits depend
upon the existence of an agreement."); Turner, supra note 5, at 656 (finding scope
of Sherman Act dictated by scope of term "agreement").
20. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940)
("[P] rice-fixing agreements... are all banned because of their actual or potential
threat to the central nervous system of the economy."); United States v. Brown
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) (affirming principle that agreement to fix or
control prices is per se violation). Other examples of per se violations of Section
One include bid-rigging and market allocation. See ABA SEcriON, supra note 6, at
53-57 (asserting that per se violations are used in cases which rarely have plausible
procompetitive justifications) (citations omitted). In contrast to per se unlawful
restraints of trade under Section One, there is "a rule of reason," which looks at
the effects of actions on competition to determine if such action is an unreasona-
ble restraint of trade. See RULE OF REASON, supra note 18, at 1 (stating that per se
rules have been limited in recent cases) (citation omitted); see also ABA SECTION,
supra note 6, at 60, 73-77 (stating that circuit courts have created various burden
shifting approaches to "rule of reason")
21. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (rely-
ing solely on circumstantial evidence); Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA,
346 F.3d 1287, 1299 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems.,
Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 569 (11th Cir. 1998)) (recognizing that it is rare for plaintiff to
1312 [Vol. 50: p. 1309
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dence must often suffice. 2 2 The United States Supreme Court has, how-
ever, identified a problem in making inferences from circumstantial
evidence about alleged anti-competitive behavior. 23 The Court has nar-
rowed the range of permissible inferences so as not to discourage what is
actually competitive behavior.
24
This heightened standard is applied when deciding whether to grant
a defendant's motion for summary judgment. 25 The Supreme Court has
held that unlawful anti-competitive behavior cannot be inferred from am-
biguous evidence. 26 This principle is often applied in cases of conscious
parallelism. 27 Numerous circuit courts have addressed the problem of
granting summary judgment in suits based on conscious parallelism and
have generally required plaintiffs to establish plus factors to withstand
summary judgment.28  Nevertheless, two different approaches have
evolved to interpret the Supreme Court's standard and the treatment of
plus factors.29
have direct evidence of conspiracy); ABA SECTION, supra note 6, at 6-7 (noting
court's general recognition that direct evidence of conspiracy is rare) (citations
omitted); Michael K. Vaska, Comment, Conscious Parallelism and Price Fixing: Defin-
ing the Boundary, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 508, 508 (1985) (noting that evidence of con-
scious parallelism is frequently important in proving conspiracy).
22. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d
1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that plaintiffs do not have to submit direct evi-
dence, but can rely on circumstantial evidence); ABA SECTION, supra note 6, at 6
(acknowledging that, lacking direct evidence, circumstantial evidence is typically
dispositive); Piraino, supra note 13, at 14 (stating that circumstantial evidence is
generally only evidence available in cases of tacit price fixing).
23. See Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986) (expressing concern that some theories of conspiracy may also be consis-
tent with competitive behavior); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S.
752, 763 (1984) (expressing concern that allowing inferences could punish legiti-
mate competitive behavior).
24. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (stating that inferences of conspiracy can-
not be allowed where behavior is consistent with permissible behavior); Monsanto,
465 U.S. at 764 (holding that there must be evidence that tends to exclude possi-
bility of independent action).
25. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357 (discussing limited inferential
summary judgment standard); Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1300 (asserting that in
accordance with heightened summary judgment standard evidence must support
conspiracy more than it supports conscious parallelism); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc.
v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing
heightened summary judgment standard); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166
F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (same).
26. For a discussion of the Supreme Court limitation of permissible inference
from circumstantial evidence, see infra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
27. For a discussion of conscious parallelism as one example of the higher
burden of evidence, see infra notes 48-65 and accompanying text.
28. For a discussion of the various approaches the circuit courts have used in
applying plus factors, see infra notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
29. For a discussion of the two approaches the circuit courts have taken in
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A. Monsanto and Matsushita
The Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp. 30 and
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.31 announced that
plaintiffs in antitrust suits must bear a heavier burden to survive summary
judgment.3 2 The Supreme Court, in narrowing the range of permissible
inferences that can be drawn from circumstantial evidence, did not, how-
ever, change the actual standard of summary judgment from that of an
ordinary case. 33 This higher standard of evidence protects innocent con-
duct, which may appear to be concerted but is not proscribed under the
Sherman Act.
3 4
In Monsanto, the Supreme Court dealt with an alleged conspiracy be-
tween a manufacturer of corn herbicide and its distributors. 35 The plain-
tiff, a distributor, alleged that the manufacturer, Monsanto, terminated its
distributorship in response to complaints by other distributors about the
plaintiff's price-cutting.3 6 The Court was concerned that " [ p]ermitting an
agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of complaints . . .
could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct."37 The Court explic-
30. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
31. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
32. See id. at 588 (stating "antitrust law limits the range of permissible infer-
ences from ambiguous evidence"); Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64 (holding that
court cannot allow agreement to be inferred from ambiguous information).
33. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding plaintiffs burden is no different in antitrust case); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1405b (claiming Matsushita did not change underlying
summaryjudgment principle); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (holding that in
deciding on motions for summary judgment inferences from facts must be viewed
in light most favorable to opposing party and that antitrust law limits those infer-
ences ). Summaryjudgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact." FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
34. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596 (finding motivation to enter into alleged
conspiracy crucial to proving such conspiracy); Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763 (claiming
that allowing inferences may "penalize perfectly legitimate conduct"); see also In re
Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating "higher thresh-
old" is required to protect action that enhances competition). Commentators
have recognized Matsushita as holding that absent a motivation to enter into a
conspiracy, combined with a plausible theory of conspiracy itself, inferences of
conspiracy should not be allowed from ambiguous evidence. See AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1412b2 (discussing Matsushita precedent).
35. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 756 (stating facts). The plaintiff, Spray-Rite, had
been a distributor of Monsanto herbicides from 1957 to 1968. See id. (same). In
1968, when Monsanto declined to renew Spray-Rite's distributorship, Spray-Rite
was the tenth largest distributor, out of approximately 100 distributors. See id. at
757 (same).
36. See id. (stating facts). The plaintiff further alleged that Monsanto and its
distributors had conspired to fix the resale prices of Monsanto's herbicides. See id.
(same). The lower court found that "'proof of termination following competitor
complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action.'" Id. at 758
(quoting Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co. 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th Cir.
1982)).
37. See id. at 763 (finding lower court mistakenly permitted such inference).
[Vol. 50: p. 13091314
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itly held that "there must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility
of independent action .... ,8
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court reaffirmed and clarified the princi-
ples announced in Monsanto.39 The Court identified two concerns justify-
ing the limitation on permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence.
40
First, the alleged conspirators had no plausible motivation to engage in
the conspiracy; and second, the alleged conspiracy was itself implausible
and closely resembled competitive behavior. 41 The Court stressed that the
predatory price-cutting scheme alleged in this case would be a highly spec-
ulative venture for a firm and that allowing inferences of conspiracy from
price-cutting could deter what the Court described as the "essence of
competition."4 2
B. Conscious Parallelism
Related to the higher standard announced in Monsanto and Matsu-
shita is the phenomenon known as conscious parallelism. 43 Conscious
parallelism may occur in situations, whereby, competitors in a market that
is controlled by a small number of firms can predict the responses of other
38. Id. at 768. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence in this case
that allowed an inference of conspiracy. See id. (criticizing lower court's standard).
There was testimony from a Monsanto manager that it threatened other price-
cutting distributors if they did not maintain prices and a newsletter that called for
playing by the "rules of the game." See id. at 766 (finding it reasonable to infer that
newsletter referred to agreement to maintain prices).
39. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (citing language from Monsanto that evi-
dence must "tend[ ] to exclude the possibility" of independent action). The alle-
gation in this case involved a price-cutting scheme in which the defendants,
Japanese owned manufacturers of consumer electronics, conspired to drive Ameri-
can firms out of the business by maintaining low prices in the United States, while
at the same time maintaining high prices in Japan. See id. at 577-78 (stating facts).
40. See id. at 588-95 (discussing lack of motive to enter into price-cutting
scheme that was unlikely to yield greater long-term profits, and that danger of
mistaken inferences in price-cutting schemes is greater); see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1412b2 (discussing Matsushita precedent).
41. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-95 (finding that without motivation, im-
plausible predatory pricing schemes are self-deterring because they require de-
fendants to incur losses). The Court found that the need for identifying and
punishing illegal conspiracy should be balanced against chilling competitive be-
havior. See id. at 594 (finding balance one-sided in cases such as this).
42. See id. at 594-97 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e)) (finding economic reali-
ties tend to make predatory pricing schemes self-deterring and that absence of
plausible motive is highly relevant to finding "genuine issue for trial").
43. See Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300-01
(11th Cir. 2003) (applying principles of Monsanto and Matsushita to cases of con-
scious parallelism); InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating plus factors are required in allegations based conscious parallelism
in order to "allay the concerns expressed by the Supreme Court"); see also Piraino,
supa note 13, at 29 (stating that "[t] he Monsanto/Matsushita approach places oli-
gopoly regulation on its head").
13152005] CASEBRIEF
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competitors to its business decisions, such as pricing.44 If one firm decides
to raise their prices in an oligopolistic market, that firm can, in effect,
hope that the other firms will recognize the extra profit to be gained by
similarly raising their prices and by avoiding a price war.4 5 This has been
described as a form of "tacit agreement," "tacit collusion," or "interdepen-
dent decision-making." 46 Although there are some commentators who ar-
gue that this type of action is essentially no different from a traditional
conspiracy and should be illegal under Section One of the Sherman Act,
44. See Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 227 (1993) (defining conscious parallelism as "the process, not in itself unlaw-
ful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect share monopoly
power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level by recog-
nizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to
price and output decisions"); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1429 (assert-
ing that interdependent decisions can reach same result as cartels); see also Turner,
supra note 5, at 656 (describing phenomenon as "oligopoly pricing"). This type of
decision-making has been termed "interdependent" and has given rise to the "the-
ory of interdependence." RicHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw 55-60 (2d ed. 2001)
(criticizing "interdependence theory of oligopolistic pricing").
45. See Turner, supra note 5, at 661 (stating that this situation is impossible in
market dominated by large number of firms because drop in price by one competi-
tor is unlikely to effect another competitor). But see POSNER, supra note 44, at 57-60
(asserting that oligopoly pricing theory fails to consider that firm in concentrated
market may still have incentive to cut prices). Turner discusses the case of Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), where from 1928 to 1940 all
three manufacturers of cigarettes charged identical prices for cigarettes and any
price change by one manufacturer was immediately followed by another. See id. at
804-05 (detailing how big three cigarette manufacturers were found to have con-
spired in selling cigarettes to dealers); Turner, supra note 5, at 661 (discussing
American Tobacco as example of non-competitive behavior in oligopoly situation).
This case, Turner claims, is a classic oligopoly pricing case, where the cigarette
makers knew that if they raised their prices the other firms would respond accord-
ingly; thus, as was the case, the manufactures substantially increased their profits
even with declining sales. See id. (same). Parallel behavior does not, however, al-
ways reflect interdependent decision-making. See id. at 658 (stating that conscious
parallelism is not even evidence of tacit agreement unless it would not be in indi-
vidual's self-interest notwithstanding all competitors taking similar action). Tur-
ner claims the situation in Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), illustrates a case where parallel behavior may not have
been the result of interdependent decision-making. See Turner, supra note 5, at
658-59 (asserting that situation is possible where all business came to same conclu-
sion based on their own self-interest). In Theatre Enterprises, the plaintiff alleged
that movie producer-distributors conspired to limit "first run" movies to downtown
Baltimore theatres. See id. at 657 (discussing facts). Nevertheless, as Turner notes,
rational and completely independent decisions by the movie distributors could
have brought about the same result. See id. at 659 (noting that occasionally even
identical prices may be result of truly independent decisions in stable industries).
46. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1410b (stating that oligopolists
can "tacitly coordinate" prices just by observing market); POSNER, supra note 44, at
53 (stating preference of calling conscious parallelism "tacit collusion"); George A.
Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antitrust Law, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 440
(1982) (identifying common terminology); Piraino, supra note 13, at 10 (claiming
oligoplists "consensus pric[ing]" is growing problem); Turner, supra note 5, at 663
(arguing that conscious parallelism may not be "agreement" in "traditional" sense,
however, competitors are knowingly taking advantage of interdependence).
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the Supreme Court and circuits courts have uniformly found otherwise, as
have numerous other commentators.
4 7
Before the Supreme Court's holdings in Monsanto and Matsushita, the
problem of conscious parallelism had been identified and solutions had
been proposed. 48 The consensus approach has been for courts to look for
additional plus factors in conjunction with parallel behavior in order to
allow an inference of conspiracy.49 These plus factors typically include:
evidence that the defendant had a motive to enter into a conspiracy, evi-
dence that the defendant acted against their self interest and other evi-
dence which points to a traditional conspiracy.50 The first two of these
47. See Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 540-41 (holding that parallel business behav-
ior is not itself violation of Sherman Act); In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d
350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding conscious parallelism alone is not proscribed by
Sherman Act); Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300-
01 (11th Cir. 2003) (same); Blomkest Fertilizer v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,
203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (same); Merck-Medco Managed
Care, LLC v. Rite-Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *15 (4th Cir. Sept. 7,
1999) (unpublished per curiam opinion) (same); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d
1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 859
(10th Cir. 1999) (same); Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478,
484 (1st Cir. 1988) (same); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir.
1987) (same); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1432a-g (identifying
problems with equating tacit agreement with express agreement, such as no equi-
table remedy and that oligopolist may be forced into conspiracy); Turner, supra
note 5, at 671 (stating that conscious parallelism may be considered "agreement,"
but should not be considered "unlawful agreement"). But see POSNER, supra note
44, at 55-56 (criticizing distinction between "tacit" and "explicit" collusion);
Piraino, supra note 13, at 15 ("[T]acit collusion should be illegal on its face, be-
cause it harms consumers without any offsetting economic benefit."). Posner criti-
cizes Turner's argument that there can be no effective remedy to conscious
parallelism. See POSNER, supra note 44, at 57-59 (asserting that Turner's arguments
are based on "interdependence theory of oligopolist pricing," which Posner re-
gards as inadequate).
48. See Theatre Enters., 346 U.S. at 540-41 (holding that parallel business behav-
ior is not itself violation of Sherman Act); Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 781 (same); see
also Turner, supra note 5, at 671-73 (concluding that consciously parallel pricing
should not be unlawful under Sherman Act and some "other evidence" that points
to "something more" should be necessary to survive motion to dismiss by defen-
dant). Some commentators have argued that the circuit courts' current treatment
of conscious parallelism is inconsistent with pre-Monsanto/Matsushita Supreme
Court decisions. See Piraino, supra note 13, at 29 ("The lower federal courts' inter-
pretation of Monsanto and Matsushita flies in the face of the Supreme Court's his-
torical willingness to infer the existence of a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy
from circumstantial evidence.").
49. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1434 (asserting that courts have
rarely allowed finding of conspiracy without such plus factors).
50. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (stating three categories of plus
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plus factors, however, often simply restate the phenomenon of conscious
parallelism. 51
C. Circuit Courts
Conscious parallelism and the problem of plus factors has not been
addressed by the Supreme Court in light of its rulings in Monsanto and
Matsushita; however, the majority of the circuit courts have struggled with
the proper burden to place on plaintiffs. 52 The lower courts' interpreta-
tion of the raised standard has often proved insurmountable by plaintiffs
in cases alleging horizontal price fixing in an oligopolist market.53 Never-
theless, two divergent approaches have emerged: one following a broad,
strict interpretation of the Monsanto/Matsushita standard and another ap-
plying a narrow, more relaxed standard.
54
1. A Broad Interpretation: The Eleventh and Eighth Circuits
Two recent decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have tightly adhered to the language in Mat-
sushita requiring evidence that "tends to establish a conspiracy more than
it indicates conscious parallelism."55 The Eleventh Circuit in Williamson
51. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1434c (recognizing that con-
spiratorial motivation and acts against self-interest merely restate theory of
interdependence).
52. See generally In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 359-60 (discussing summary judg-
ment standard); Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (same); In re High Fructose Corn
Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Blomkest Fertilizer,
203 F.3d at 1032 (same); see also Robert W. Doyle, Jr. & Andre P. Barlow, Avoiding
Summary Judgment in Antitrust Conspiracy Cases: Is the Seventh Circuit Pro-Enforcement?,
SJ054 ALI-ABA 581, 586 (2004) (concluding that most circuit courts' interpreta-
tion of Monsanto/Matsushita standard imposes difficult obstacle to plaintiffs'
claims).
53. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1291 (affirming grant of summary judg-
ment); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1035 (finding documents alluding to price
fixing were "at most, ambiguous"); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112,
118 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding suspicious internal documents not sufficient to defeat
summary judgment); see also Doyle, supra note 52, at 586 (concluding that most
courts have imposed difficult burden); Piraino, supra note 13, at 29 (stating that
under prevailing view of Monsanto/Matsushita standard, plaintiffs will not get to
jury unless they come up with direct uncontradicted evidence).
54. Compare Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (asserting that districts court's
duty is not to assess credibility of evidence but to determine if evidence tends to
establish conspiracy more than it indicates conscious parallelism) (quotations
from original omitted), with In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 663 (finding
evidence "highly suggestive" of conspiracy sufficient to withstand summary judg-
ment). See also Doyle, supra note 52, at 586 (stating that Seventh Circuit has inter-
preted Matsushita more narrowly than other circuits); David L. Meyer, The Seventh
Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup Decision-Sweet for Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, 17
ANTITRUST 67, 67 (2002) (same).
55. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (discussing district court's duty of
weighing evidence); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1032 (claiming to be with major-
ity of circuits that apply Matsushita standard broadly).
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Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA, 56 and the Eighth Circuit in Blomkest Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,57 have taken the guidance from the
Supreme Court and created a three-step summary judgment analysis in
suits alleging price fixing.58 First, a plaintiff has to establish evidence that
the defendants have engaged in parallel pricing. 59 Second, a plaintiff
must show the existence of one or more plus factors that tends to exclude
the possibility of independent action. 60 Third, the establishment of these
first two factors creates a rebuttable presumption of price fixing, which the
defendant can defeat with their own evidence.
6
'
The Eighth Circuit's treatment of alleged plus factors in Blomkest Fertil-
izer is illustrative of this approach. 62 In that case the plaintiffs alleged
56. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
57. 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000).
58. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (fashioning test by which plaintiff can
"demonstrate the existence of 'plus factors' that remove their evidence from the
realm of equipoise"); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (citing Todorov v. DCH
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991)) ("A plaintiff has the
burden to present evidence of consciously paralleled pricing supplemented with one
or more plus factors.").
59. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (stating first step in summary judg-
ment analysis); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (same). This requirement is
similar to the Third Circuit, which requires a plaintiff to establish a pattern of
parallel behavior among the defendants, that the defendants were aware of each
other's conduct and that it served as a basis for their decision. See Petruzzi's IGA
Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir. 1993)
(stating three-step test for surviving summary judgment in cases of conspiracy
based on conscious parallelism).
60. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (stating second step in summary judg-
ment analysis); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (same). The court in Williamson
Oil identified some specific plus factors, which included: showing the defendants'
behavior would not be in their economic self interest if there were not a conspiracy
to fix prices and any other showing that "tends to exclude the possibility of inde-
pendent action." See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (citing City of Tuscaloosa v.
Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998)) (stating "plus fac-
tors"). It has been recognized by courts and commentators that actions taken by a
defendant contrary to their self-interest is a restatement of the phenomenon of
conscious parallelism. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir.
2004) (acknowledging that actions by defendant against self-interest restate theory
of interdependence); see also POSNER, supra note 44, at 100 (asserting that listing
actions taken contrary to self-interest as plus factor creates ambiguity by inviting
"defendants to argue that they were not competing because it was not in their self-
interest to compete").
61. See Williamson Oi4 346 F.3d at 1301 (holding that defendant can defeat
presumption of price fixing by "presenting evidence establishing that no reasona-
ble factfinder could conclude that they entered into a price fixing conspiracy");
Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (stating that once plaintiff meets its initial bur-
den court must still determine whether evidence tends to exclude independent
action); see also Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456 n.30 (stating that plus factors only create
rebuttable presumption of conspiracy) (citation omitted).
62. See Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1033 (stating plaintiffs allegations).
Blomkest Fertilizer involved allegations that six Canadian and two American potash
companies conspired to raise the price of potash. See id. at 1031 (stating facts).
The primary allegation stemmed from the negotiations of a Suspension Agree-
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three plus factors along with evidence of the defendant's parallel pricing
behavior: (1) high level interfirm communications about price informa-
tion; (2) actions against self-interest by not cutting prices; and (3) expert
testimony that prices were above the expected market value without collu-
sion. 6 3 The court dismissed all three alleged plus factors as speculative, by
positing possible alternative justifications for the actions or, in the case of
the expert testimony, dismissing it as "fundamentally unreliable." 64 Simi-
larly, the court in Williamson Oil went through an exhaustive examination
of each of the plaintiffs' alleged "plus factors" and determined that none
of them independently, or in concert, amounted to an actual plus factor. 6 5
2. A Narrow Interpretation: The Seventh Circuit
In contrast to the broad approach of other circuits, the Seventh Cir-
cuit has approached oligopolist price coordination more loosely, in what
commentators have termed a "narrow" interpretation of the Monsanto/
Matsushita standard. 6 6 In In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litiga-
ment between the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan and the United States De-
partment of Commerce after a finding that the defendant had been engaged in
dumping potash in the United States market. See id. at 1031-32 (same). This Sus-
pension Agreement had the immediate effect of raising potash prices, however,
prices continued to rise above the minimum price required by the Agreement. See
id. at 1032 (same).
63. See id. (outlining alleged plus factors). The interfirm communication in-
volved "meetings at trade shows and conventions, price verification calls, discus-
sions regarding a Canadian potash export association, and the like." Id. at 1033.
The court found that there was no evidence that the exchanges of pricing informa-
tion impacted pricing decisions. See id. at 1035 (dismissing allegation as
speculative).
64. See id. at 1035-38 (analyzing evidence of plus factors). The dissent in this
case criticized the court's treatment of the evidence. See id. at 1039 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (alleging that majority "rejects circumstantial evidence of conspiracy
and requires direct evidence to withstand summary judgment in an antitrust
case"). The dissent also noted that the potash market was conducive to oligopolis-
tic pricing because the demand for potash is highly inelastic, meaning that pur-
chasers will buy the same amount of potash whether the price goes up or down.
See id. (Gibson, J., dissenting) (describing potash market).
65. See Williamson Oi4 346 F.3d at 1319 (asserting that plaintiffs have only es-
tablished that tobacco industry is classic oligopoly). The court considered eleven
factors that the appellants raised:
(1) signaling of intentions; (2) permanent allocations programs; (3)
monitoring of sales; (4) actions taken contrary to economic self-interest
... (5) nature of the market; (6) strong motivation; (7) reduction in the
number of price tiers; (8) opportunities to conspire; (9) pricing decisions
made at high levels; (10) the smoking and health conspiracy; and (11)
foreign conspiracies.
Id. at 1305 (citation omitted). The court, in dismissing each of the plus factors
submitted by plaintiffs, relied heavily on alternative possible explanations of each
individual claim. See id. at 1305-19 (analyzing alleged plus factors).
66. See Doyle, supra note 52, at 586 (claiming Seventh Circuit interprets Mat-
sushita more narrowly); Meyer, supra note 54, at 67 (asserting Seventh Circuit al-
lows "almost any shred of evidence providing support for such a conspiracy ...
sufficient to send the case to the jury").
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tion,6 7 judge Posner held that Matsushita's heightened inferential standard
does not apply when an oligopolist market behaves like classic interdepen-
dent "tacit" price coordination. 68 This holding translates into a heavy de-
pendence on economic evidence to show that prices were higher than
could be expected without coordination, and that the defendants behaved
counter to their self-interest if not for the existence of an agreement.69
This analysis, Judge Posner admits, is consistent with a tacit agreement-
conscious parallelism.70 Therefore, there must be some additional evi-
dence of an explicit agreement; however, the evidence need not exclude
the possibility of independent action nor rule out alternative
explanations.
7 1
The defendants in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup were manufacturers of
high fructose corn syrup, who were alleged to have conspired to fix
prices.72 After going through an extensive economic analysis, Judge Pos-
ner discussed the circumstantial evidence of an express agreement to con-
spire.73 This evidence amounted to a series of communications by
representatives of the defendant corporations, which were highly sugges-
67. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
68. See id. at 661 (asserting that high fructose corn syrup market was condu-
cive to price fixing and that defendant's actions limited competition, thus, Matsu-
shita's strict requirements do not apply); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HALv. L. REv. 917, 926 (2003) ("Under Posner's
approach, once one determines that the market is conducive to collusion and has
some of the suspicious practices that suggest collusion, little of nothing in the way
of additional 'explicit' evidence of collusion is required."); Piraino, supra note 13,
at 31 (claiming In re High Fructose Corn Syrup lowered standard of evidence based
on plausibility of collusive conduct). Judge Posner's approach has also been criti-
cized. See Meyer, supra note 54, at 70 ("The HFCS decision turns this approach
[the Matsushita standard] upside down by allowing the plaintiff to avoid summary
judgment with evidence only 'one plausible' interpretation of which supports the
plaintiffs' conspiracy hypothesis.").
69. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 655 (stating that "economic
evidence is important in a case such as this"); see also Doyle, supra note 52, at 587
(notingJudge Posner relied heavily on finding market conducive to collusion and
that defendants were not competing against each other); Hovenkamp, supra note
68, at 926 (stating thatJudge Posner has deviated from other circuit's "unfortunate
misinterpretation" of Matsushita); Piraino, supra note 13, at 31-32 (noting Judge
Posner's departure from strict following of Matsushita in oligopoly price fixing
cases).
70. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 661 (stating that question is
whether there is enough evidence presented to allow reasonable juror to find ex-
plicit agreement).
71. See id. at 663 (stating that evidence was "highly suggestive of the existence
of an explicit though of course covert agreement to fix prices").
72. See id. at 655 (stating facts). There are six major manufacturers of high
fructose corn syrup: Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), A.E., Staley, Cargill, Ameri-
can Maize-Products and CPC International. See id. at 655 (same). CPC settled and
was not a party to this litigation. See id. at 654 (same).
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tive of price fixing.7 4 The court was particularly clear in stating that the
evidence was to be considered as a whole, concluding: "[t]he evidence is
not conclusive by any means-there are alternative interpretations of
every bit of it-but it is highly suggestive of the existence of an explicit
though of course covert agreement to fix prices." 75 It is almost certain
that this amount of evidence would not have been sufficient in the Eighth
or Eleventh Circuits to withstand summary judgment.76
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH AND IN RE FLAT GLASS
A. A History of the Third Circuit's Approach to Conscious Parallelism
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has consist-
ently held that consciously parallel behavior is not itself a violation of the
Sherman Act.7 7 Before the Supreme Court announced the higher stan-
dard of permissible inferences in Monsanto and Matsushita, the Third Cir-
cuit treated conscious parallelism alone as insufficient to support an
inference of conspiracy and required some additional evidence of conspir-
acy. 78 Nevertheless, after Monsanto and Matsushita the Third Circuit be-
gan to analyze the treatment of plus factors and the standard of
permissible inferences with regard to this heightened standard. 79 The
74. See id. at 663 (summarizing circumstantial evidence). In one document
the president of a firm stated, "our competitors are our friends. Our customers are
the enemy." See id. at 662 (same). Another document referred to new competitors
entering the market and stated they will "play by the rules." See id. (same).
75. Id. at 663.
76. For a discussion of the standard applied by the Eighth and Eleventh Cir-
cuit, see supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
77. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 359-60 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding Sherman Act does not proscribe conscious parallelism); In re Baby Food
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1999) (same); Petruzzi's IGA Supermar-
kets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); see
also In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 1983)
(finding conscious parallelism standing alone only slight evidence of conspiracy),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574 (1986); Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d
205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that conscious parallelism when supported by
other evidence can suffice to allow inference of conspiracy); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (same); Venzie Corp. v. United States
Mineral Prods. Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d Cir. 1975) (establishing two-part test
for inference of agreement from conscious parallelism); Del. Valley Marine Supply
Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199, 203 (3d Cir. 1961) ("[conscious parallelism]
is circumstantial evidence the probative value of which necessarily varies with the
kind of parallelism and the factual setting where it is found") (citation omitted).
78. See, e.g., In reJapanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.3d at 304 (finding conscious paral-
lelism on its own insufficient to permit inference of conspiracy); Schoenkopf 637
F.2d at 208 (noting that conscious parallelism when supported by other evidence
can suffice to allow inference of conspiracy).
79. See InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 165 (3d Cir. 2003)
(requiring "plus factors" to satisfy concerns of Monsanto and Matsushita); In re Baby
Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (stating that because conscious parallelism is circumstantial,
plus factors are required to avoid punishing legal independent conduct); Petruzzi's
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Third Circuit, however, began to depart conceptually from analyzing cases
of conscious parallelism under the higher standard and, most recently in
In re Flat Glass, appears to have adopted the narrow interpretation of
Matsushita.8
0
The Third Circuit developed its current approach to allegations of
conspiracy based on conscious parallelism in Petruzzi's IGA Supermarket, Inc.
v. Darling-Delaware Co.81 In Petruzzi's IGA, the court recognized that "an
antitrust plaintiff can establish concerted action through the defendant's
behavior standing alone."8 2 Nevertheless, the court noted that con-
sciously parallel behavior is merely circumstantial evidence that has to be
supplemented with additional evidence, plus factors, in order to prove a
conspiracy.8 3 In this regard, the Third Circuit is firmly in line with the
majority of the circuit courts' interpretation of the Monsanto/Matsushita
standard.
84
The Third Circuit's analysis in Petruzzi's IGA, however, departed from
the majority of circuits, finding that more liberal inferences from circum-
stantial evidence can be made where the concerns of Matsushita-implau-
sibility of conspiracy theory and hindering procompetitive behavior-were
IGA, 998 F.2d at 1242 (holding that plus factors are derived from concerns of
Matsushita).
80. See, e.g., In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358-61 (finding that in absence of
concerns of Matsushita, courts cautiousness in allowing inferences from circum-
stantial evidence in oligopolistic price-fixing is driven instead by theory of interde-
pendence). This departure appears to have begun in Petruzzi's IGA, where the
court noted that absent the concerns present in Matsushita more liberal inferences
could be made. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1232 (contrasting present case with
Matsushita).
81. 998 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1993). The defendants in this case were rendering
companies who purchased meat scraps from supermarkets and butcher shops. See
id. at 1228 (stating facts). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to:
(1) refrain from soliciting other competitors' accounts; (2) submit collusive bids to
certain accounts; (3) settle "allocation disputes"; and (4) urge others to join in the
conspiracy. See id. (same).
82. Id. at 1242; see also Schoenkopf 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating
conscious parallelism can be basis for conspiracy claim).
83. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1242 (finding that illegal conspiracy can, in
addition to being proven by direct evidence and economic evidence, be proven by
conscious parallelism); see also In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (discussing develop-
ment of theory that interdependent behavior is not "agreement" under Sherman
Act); Intervest, 340 F.3d at 165 (finding conspiracy can be proven under theory of
conscious parallelism when plaintiff can establish necessary elements); In re Baby
Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that "interdepen-
dent parallelism can be a necessary fact of life but be the result of independent
pricing decisions").
84. See, e.g., Williamson Oil, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301
(11th Cir. 2003) (requiring plus factors); Blomkest Fertilizer v. Potash Corp. of
Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); In re Citric Acid Litig.,
191 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4,
1434 (stating that majority of courts require plus factors).
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not present.8 5 The court found that neither of the concerns identified in
Matsushita that justified the heightened standard were implicated in this
case.86 Therefore, the court held that more liberal inferences were per-
missible. 8 7 The Third Circuit continued to follow this precedent in In re
Baby Food Antitrust Litigation,88 stating, "[t] he acceptable inferences which
we can draw from circumstantial evidence vary with the plausibility of the
plaintiff's theory and the danger associated with such inferences."
8 9
B. The Latest Word: In Re Flat Glass
1. Facts and Procedural History
In In re Flat Glass, the Third Circuit made a comprehensive restate-
ment of the applicable summary judgment standard in cases of conspiracy
based on evidence of conscious parallelism. 90 This case arose out of the
firing of two executives of Libbey-Owens-Ford Company ("LOF") who,
while under indictment for conspiracy, mail and wire fraud and money
laundering, alleged that LOF had conspired with its competitors to fix
prices in the glass products industry.91 Several antitrust lawsuits were
85. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1242 (noting that Matsushita reflects concern
not to curb "procompetitive behavior"); see also In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357
(finding concerns of Matsushita not applicable where conspiracy theory is not im-
plausible and action could not be mistaken for competitive behavior); Intervest, 340
F.3d at 161-62 (following Petruzzi's IGA's holding, but finding it not applicable); In
re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (finding concern for inferring illegal agreement from
conscious parallelism stems from concern in Matsushita not to punish unilateral
action).
86. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1232 (stating summary judgment standard).
The two concerns were: (1) that the plaintiffs theory was implausible; and (2)
permitting an inference of conspiracy could deter competitive behavior. See id.
(discussing Matsushita precedent) (citation omitted). The court stated that the
plaintiff's theory of conspiracy made "perfect economic sense" and that the chal-
lenged activities-refusing to bid on accounts-cannot be labeled as "the very es-
sence of competition." See id. at 1232 (same). Other circuits have also suggested
that a looser standard may be applied when the concerns identified in Matsushita
are not present. See Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-
2847, 1999 WL 691840, at *15 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (unpublished per curium
opinion) (same); Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 858 (10th Cir. 1999)
(same).
87. See Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1232 (discussing appropriate standard of
summary judgment). But see Meyer, supra note 54, at 71 (claiming that Petruzzi's
JGA did not go so far as to suggest that ambiguous evidence should be treated
differently merely because of oligopolistic interdependence).
88. 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).
89. Id. at 124.
90. See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 356-61 (discussing application of summary
judgment in cases alleging per se violation of Section One of Sherman Act, as it
applies in context of standard announced in Matsushita and theory of interdepen-
dence). The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district
court to grant the defendant summaryjudgment. See id. at 353 (summarizing case
procedure).
91. See id. at 354 (citing In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 288 F.3d 83, 86 (3d
Cir. 2002)) (stating facts).
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filed, and the plaintiffs settled with all defendants except PPG Industries,
Inc. ("PPG"). 9 2
There were two separate allegations against PPG. The first was based
on a conspiracy to fix and maintain the price of flat glass. 93 In the flat
glass market, five manufacturing firms accounted for over ninety percent
of the flat glass sold in the United States.94 The allegation revolved
around a series of three closely timed and nearly identical increases in the
firms' list prices for flat glass. 95 Each of these three price increases was
surrounded by communications between the firms and statements that
suggested an agreement between the firms.96 The second allegation was
based on a conspiracy to align and stabilize the price of automotive re-
placement glass by using the same "National Auto Glass Specifications
(NAGS) Calculator" to set truckload prices.9 7 The Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment on this second claim, but
reversed the first claim.9 8
2. Reasoning
The Third Circuit began its analysis by laying out the general frame-
work of a Section One claim of horizontal price fixing under the Sherman
Act.99 The court, following Petruzzi's IGA, distinguished the present case
from the line of cases following Matsushita's higher evidentiary thresh-
92. See id. (same).
93. See id. (stating allegations). Flat glass is a type of glass produced by the
"float process," where "[m]olten glass is poured over a bath of higher-density mol-
ten liquid, such as molten tin." Id. at 353. The end product is used primarily in
construction and in automotive glass. See id. (describing flat glass industry).
94. See id. (describing facts). Of these five firms, PPG was responsible for 28%
of all domestic flat glass shipments, LOF and AFG Industries, Inc. were each re-
sponsible for 19% and Guardian Industries and Ford Motor Co. each accounted
for 15%. See id. (same).
95. See id. at 355 (summarizing allegation). The first of the three price in-
creases occurred in June andJuly of 1991, when PPG announced a 7.5-9% increase
and the four other competitors announced similar increase to be effective on the
same day. See id. at 364 (summarizing price increases). The second occurred in
September and October of 1992, with increases of 5-9% by every competitor. See
id. at 365 (same). In May and June of 1993, the five flat glass manufacturers all
announced a third price increase of 5.5%. See id. at 366-67 (same).
96. See id. at 364-67 (summarizing price increases).
97. See id. at 355 (stating allegation). The National Auto Glass Specifications
(NAGS) publishes a NAGS Calculator, which supplies a suggested recommended
price for a glass installer to charge a customer for each type of automotive glass.
See id. (discussing allegation that manufacturers used NAGS recommended prices
to work backwards to set truckload prices). The court found this allegation merit-
less, and it will not be discussed further in this Casebrief. See id. at 370 (dismissing
second claim).
98. See id. at 355 (stating holding). The court also addressed some evidentiary
rulings of the district court that are not pertinent to this discussion. See id. at 370
(discussing district court's exclusion of certain evidence).
99. See id. at 356 (noting that price-fixing is per se violation).
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old. 100 Summarizing the theory of interdependence, Judge Chertoff
found that caution must still be used in making inferences from circum-
stantial evidence, and that any claim of conspiracy based on conscious par-
allelism must establish certain plus factors. 10 1
In In reFlat Glass, the court listed three plus factors: "(1) evidence that
the defendant has a motive to enter into a price fixing conspiracy; (2)
evidence that the defendant acted contrary to its interests; and (3) 'evi-
dence implying a traditional conspiracy."' 10 2 Judge Chertoff described
the flat glass market as a "textbook" example of a market susceptible to
collusion, which he found gave the defendant sufficient motive to enter
into an agreement. 10 3 Moreover, he found that the defendant's price in-
creases were contrary to its self-interests. 10 4
In addition, the court discussed four pieces of evidence, which it held
established enough evidence of conspiracy to survive summary judg-
ment.10 5 First, the court dealt with evidence submitted by one of PPG's
competitors, "which described an agreed upon, across the board price in-
crease for the entire United States."1 0 6 The court noted that the admis-
sion did not specifically mention PPG, however, the court rejected PPG's
argument that evidence of conspiracy among other competitors is irrele-
vant. 10 7 The other three pieces of evidence involved the timing and com-
munications between the five firms surrounding three price increases
spanning a period of two years.1 08 In particular, the court examined the
exchange of pricing information among the defendants and concluded
100. See id. at 357-58 (following Petruzzi's IGA precedent in finding concerns
justifying decision in Matsushita not present). The court specifically found that
"[h]ere, like in Petruzzi's, plaintiffs' theory of conspiracy-an agreement among
oligopolists to fix prices at a supracompetitive level-makes perfect economic
sense. In addition, absent increases in marginal cost or demand, raising prices
generally does not approximate-and cannot be mistaken as-competitive con-
duct." Id. at 358.
101. See id. at 359-60 (stating that ultimate question becomes "what are 'plus
factors' that suffice to defeat summary judgment").
102. Id. at 360. The court required the third factor because, as the court
acknowledged, the first two simply restate the phenomenon of conscious parallel-
ism. See id. (discussing plus factors).
103. See id. at 361 (analyzing flat glass market).
104. See id. at 362 (finding price increases were notjustified by increased costs
or demand).
105. See id. at 363-67 (discussing plaintiffs evidence).
106. See id. at 363 (describing plaintiffs evidence) (citation omitted).
107. See id. (finding evidence of conspiracy among competitors relevant, "es-
pecially so if the sister firm's behavior mirrored that of the five conceded cocon-
spirators"). Contra In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding evidence that defendant's competitors in citric acid market conspired to
fix prices "does not tend to exclude the possibility" of independent action). The
court in In re Citric Acid, found that the defendant had "offered reasonable legiti-
mate explanations" for its pricing. See id. (same).
108. See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 364-68 (analyzing series of identical price
increases and communications between flat glass producers). For a discussion of
the individual price increases, see supra note 94 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50: p. 13091326
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that it was reasonable to infer these exchanges served as a basis for the
defendant's pricing decisions.109
In summary, the Third Circuit concluded that all of this evidence,
taken together, was sufficient-a reasonable fact-finder could conclude
PPG had conspired. °1 0 The court firmly rejected PPG's suggestion that
each piece of evidence should be analyzed separately, and that if the court
could "feasibly interpret [the evidence] as consistent with the absence of
an agreement to raise prices" then the evidence should be disregarded.",
The defendants' arguments, the court stated, were "well-suited for an ar-
gument before a jury."' 12
C. The Third Circuit Test
What has emerged in the Third Circuit is a relatively simple three-part
test for courts to follow when faced with allegations of illegal conspiracy
based on conscious parallelism.'1 3 First, ask was the defendants' behavior
parallel?1 1 4 Second, were the defendants aware of each other's conduct,
and was such awareness an element in their decision-making process? 1' 5
Third, can the plaintiff establish certain plus factors?" l 6
The Third Circuit has recognized three general categories of plus fac-
tors: (1) a motivation to enter into a conspiracy; (2) actions taken contrary
to defendant's self-interest; and (3) evidence of a traditional conspir-
acy. 117 In recognition that the first two plus factors merely restate the
109. See id. at 368-69 (noting mere presence of pricing information is not suf-
ficient evidence). The court distinguished the exchanges of information in this
case from those in In re Baby Food, on the grounds that these exchanges occurred
among executives and that here, there was evidence suggesting the information
was used to set prices. See id. at 369 (discussing evidence).
110. See id. at 368 (summarizing evidence).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 360 (stating test); Intervest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d
144, 165 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating three-part test); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig.,
166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating first two elements as one-requiring
evidence of parallel pricing supplemented with plus factors); Petruzzi's IGA Super-
markets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir. 1993) (cit-
ing Schoenkopfv. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir.
1980)) (giving three-step test).
114. See, e.g., Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1243 (outlining three element test).
115. See id. (same).
116. See In reFlat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (finding there is "no finite set" of plus
factors); In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (claiming that once parallel pricing has
been supplemented with plus factors rebuttable presumption of conspiracy exists);
Petruzzi's IGA, 998 F.2d at 1242 (discussing possible plus factors); see also WILLIAM C.
HOLMES, 1992 ANTITRUST LAw HANDBOOK § 1.103[3], at 154 (asserting wide range
of possible plus factors).
117. See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360 (stating plus factors); In re Baby Food,
166 F.3d at 122 (same). The Third Circuit first stated the requirement of these
first two factors in Venzie Corp. v. US. Mineral Products Co., 521 F.2d 1309, 1314 (3d
Cir. 1975). See alsoVaska, supra note 21, at 523 (stating Third Circuit's "Venzie" test
was based on idea that behavior alone should not allow inferences of agreement
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phenomenon of conscious parallelism, the Third Circuit requires that
some additional evidence of a traditional conspiracy be established.1 1
Most importantly, where the court finds conscious parallelism and the
plaintiff's theory of conspiracy is plausible and does not reflect competi-
tive behavior, the strict inferential standard of Monsanto and Matsushita
will not be applied.1 1 9
IV. NARROWER Is BETTER
The Third Circuit's latest word on conscious parallelism in In re Flat
Glass appears to adopt a narrow interpretation of the Monsanto/Matsushita
standard. 120 This is an advisable movement, as the narrow approach puts
proper weight on economic evidence and properly leaves the judging of
conflicting evidence to ajury.121 The broad approach, in contrast, misin-
terprets Matsushita, as well as places an almost impossible burden on
plaintiffs. 1
22
except where in certain circumstances inference of rational independent choice is
less attractive). Evidence of conscious parallelism is meaningless to proving an
unlawful agreement without showing actions contrary to the defendant's self-inter-
est or any motivation to enter into an agreement. See Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schu-
macher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1014 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Venzie, 521 F.2d at 1314)
(stating that actions taken consistent with self-interest in no way implies agree-
ment). In Alvord-Polk, the court found that the defendant's decision to forgo some
business to keep its other retailers happy could rationally be concluded as consis-
tent with its self-interest. See id. (noting that defendant would clearly benefit in
long-term).
118. See In reFlat Glass, 385 F.3d 360, 360 (stating that first two factors merely
restate theory); In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (same); see also POSNER, supra note
44, at 100 (same). In Petruzzi's IGA, the court stated that a plaintiff can survive
summary judgment without providing any evidence of a traditional conspiracy, if
they can establish the first two factors. See 998 F.2d at 1244 (cautioning against
applying these factors blindly). This may be treated as dicta, as in that case the
court found there was evidence of traditional conspiracy. See id. (finding that testi-
mony and economic evidence meet requirement). The Third Circuit has held
traditional evidence is the best way to prove a conspiracy. See id. (noting "easiest"
plus factor is evidence implying traditional conspiracy) (citation omitted).
119. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's more liberal approach to circum-
stantial evidence under these conditions, see supra notes 77-118 and accompanying
text.
120. Compare In reFlat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358 (holding more liberal inferences
are permitted because concerns of Matsushita are not present), with In re High
Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding
concerns of Matsushita not applicable). See also Doyle, supra note 52, at 589 (assert-
ing that in Seventh Circuit, heightened standard does not apply when plaintiff
establishes plausible theory of collusion).
121. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that narrow approach essentially
converts judge into thirteenth juror).
122. See Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 925 (claiming courts have misinter-
preted Matsushita); Piraino, supra note 13, at 30 (claiming that under strict inter-
pretation no plaintiff will be able to reach jury).
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The circuit courts applying a broad interpretation have misinter-
preted Matsushita as requiring circumstantial evidence that tends to ex-
clude the possibility of independent action in every situation. 123 The
Court in Matsushita was clearly only concerned with inferences of conspir-
acy when the defendants lacked a motivation to conspire and the alleged
conspiratorial actions were consistent with competitive behavior. 1 24 The
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, for example, have disregarded these under-
lying concerns and applied the heightened standard in every case, as well
as to every individual plus factor. 125
This misinterpretation is compounded by these courts' failure to dis-
tinguish between plus factors that indicate the existence of conscious par-
allelism and plus factors that indicate a traditional conspiracy. 12 6 A
plaintiff that can establish a conspiratorial motivation and acts against self-
interest has simultaneously allayed the concerns of Matsushita.127 Thus, if
an oligopolistic market is behaving as a classic example of conscious paral-
lelism, there is no justification for requiring that additional evidence tend
to exclude the possibility of independent action.' 28
The circuit courts following a broad approach have also given too
much weight to possible alternative explanations of circumstantial evi-
dence.' 29 They have, in effect, taken the job of the jury in weighing the
evidence. 13 0 For instance, the Eleventh Circuit in Williamson Oil examin-
123. See Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 925 (claiming courts have misinter-
preted Matsushita).
124. See Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587-88 (1986) (limiting inferences in cases involving implausible theory of collu-
sion); see also ABA SECrION, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing Matsushita); AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1 1412b2 (same). For a discussion of Matsushita, see
supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
125. See Williamson Oil, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th
Cir. 2003) (asserting that "plus factors" include any evidence that "tends to ex-
clude the possibility of independent action"); Blomkest Fertilizer v. Potash Corp.
of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir. 2000) (same); City of Tuscaloosa v.
Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 571 n.35 (l1th Cir. 1998) (same).
126. See Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1043 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (declaring
useful distinction between "background" plus factors, which establish market con-
ditions making conspiracy likely and plus factors, which show agreement); AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1434cl (distinguishing "conspiratorial motivation"
and acts against self-interest from other plus factors).
127. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, 1434cl (stating these two fac-
tors merely restate theory of interdependence). For a discussion of the theory of
conscious parallelism, see supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
128. See id. (discussing conscious parallelism).
129. See Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1301 (allowing establishment of "plus fac-
tors" to be rebutted by defendant); Blomkest Fertilizer, 203 F.3d at 1051 (Gibson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that court must take into account defendant's explanation of
their conduct); see also Doyle, supra note 52, at 589 (claiming courts have allowed
"defendant's legitimate business justifications to trump the plaintiffs interpretation
of ambiguous evidence").
130. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing summary judgment standard
in Matsushita). The Ninth Circuit averred:
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ing the allegation that cigarette companies had signaled price changes,
posited alternative economically sound justifications for each apparent sig-
nal.' 3 1 While the plaintiffs evidence may have been weak, l 3 2 a court
should examine all of the evidence in concert and ask only whether or not
a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendants had entered into a
conspiracy.'
3 3
The Third Circuit's approach recognizes that the higher Monsanto/
Matsushita standard will not apply in many cases of conscious parallelism
when there is a clear motive for the defendants to enter into a conspiracy
and no concern of curbing pro-competitive behavior.1 34 A plaintiff in the
Third Circuit will not face the impossible hurdle of providing circumstan-
tial evidence that excludes independent action. 135 In addition, the Third
Circuit's test adequately protects competitive business behavior by placing




To read Matsushita as requiring judges to ask whether the circumstantial
evidence is more "consistent" with the defendants' theory than with the
plaintiffs theory would imply that the jury should be permitted to choose
an inference of conspiracy only if the judge has first decided that he
would himself draw that inference. This approach would essentially con-
vert the judge into a thirteenth juror, who must be persuaded before an
antitrust violation may be found.
Id. This analysis of the summary judgment standard has been characterized as
dicta. See In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) (claiming In re
Coordinated had relied on direct evidence).
131. See Williamson Oi4 346 F.3d at 1305-10 (examining pricing signals). In
response to one alleged price signal, the court stated: "This general statement, like
so many of those on which appellants focus, plainly is a rational response to the
economic incentives ... and does not tend ... to establish a price fixing conspir-
acy." Id. at 1309.
132. See id. at 1305-10 (discussing evidence of price signaling).
133. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (find-
ing defendants' favorable interpretations of evidence "well-suited for an argument
before a jury"); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 655
(7th Cir. 2002) (noting that court should avoid "trap" of weighing conflicting
evidence).
134. See In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 359 (holding that Matsushita does not
apply).
135. See Piraino, supra note 13, at 29 (claiming that Monsanto/Matsushita stan-
dard is unworkable for courts trying to identify price-fixing conspiracies).
136. See In reFlat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360-61 ("These two plus factors are impor-
tant.., because their existence tends to eliminate the possibility of mistaking the
working of a competitive market.").
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